The Monroe Doctrine: National or International?

William I. Hull

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The Monroe Doctrine: National or International?

The Problem and Its Solution

By

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G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York and London
The Knickerbocker Press
1915

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The Knickerbocker Press, New York

PREFACE

THE prime causes of the present war in Europe were, first, the existence of big armaments, which were regarded by their respective possessors as invincible or irresistible; and, second, the grouping of a few nations into partial alliances.

One result of the war will be a determination on the part of *all* nations, belligerents and neutrals, great powers and small powers alike, to prevent future wars by the international limitation of armaments, or their conversion into an international police force, and by the further development of genuine inter-

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nationalism to take the place of partial alliances, "concerts," or "ententes."

The United States must prepare itself for leadership along this line by internationalizing the Monroe Doctrine. It cannot expect to take its rightful part in laying the foundation of permanent peace and genuine justice if it continues to insist on an exclusive responsibility for the Monroe Doctrine, and builds up armaments for the protection of that Doctrine as it is now and as it will inevitably become.

The rapid development of the Doctrine by the logic of recent events is illustrated by various facts associated with and apart from the present war. The emergence of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for Asia, the possibility of a German invasion of British and French dominions

in America, the misunderstandings of Great Britain with sundry American republics in regard to neutrality, and the continuous performance of "revolutionary" leaders in Mexico, Haiti, and elsewhere in Latin America, emphasize from different angles the folly and the wrong of a single nation attempting to perform what is essentially a world-task.

The addresses which make up this book were delivered before the present epoch-making crisis in international affairs occurred; but the thesis which they advance is not only based on the historic facts of the past score of years: it is illustrated and strengthened by the swift-moving events of the present, and it is, as the author is firmly convinced, the expression of the principle of internationalism which is to rule the future.

Washington, Madison, Hamilton, and their compeers, John Quincy Adams and the statesmen of Monroe's "era of good feeling," pleaded with Americans to "think Continentally"; that is, to realize their National, as well as their State, responsibilities and opportunities. Our fellow-countrymen of to-day must "think internationally"; that is, they must think not only "Continentally," in terms of the United States, and not only in terms of all America, but also in terms of the entire family of nations. A new *E Pluribus Unum* has dawned upon the world, and our country is peculiarly fitted and irrevocably bound to play a leading rôle in its advance. Let us prepare to play that rôle well. Even as Virginia, New York, and others of the Original Thirteen States conveyed to the Continental Con-

gress their imperial domains of Western lands, in preparation for the development of a nation and the promotion of peace and justice between the States of our Union, so must the United States convey to the representatives of the family of nations the rights and duties pertaining to the "Monroe Doctrine." Along this path alone, after the removal of this obstacle only, can we and the rest of the world attain that promised land of the new internationalism, which has found its center at "The Hague," and which includes within its circumference the preservation of permanent peace and the attainment of genuine justice between the nations.

W. I. H.

SWARTHMORE COLLEGE,
January, 1915.

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The Monroe Doctrine

I

THE PROBLEM[1]

THE Monroe Doctrine, which was regarded as the *sine qua non* of American public policy in the nineteenth century, is fast taking the aspect, in this twentieth century, of the *bête noire* or the *Frankenstein* of the Republic which called it into existence. This changing aspect is due, not only to the extraordinary development of the

[1] An address at the Fourth National Conference of the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, held in Washington, D. C., December 4, 1913.

original doctrine and to its illimitable possibilities of continuous growth, accompanied by a great and growing responsibility on the part of the United States and a remarkable progress on the part of Latin America, but also to the Old World's changing attitude toward international rights and duties and to the majestic international tribunal which is slowly rising in the midst of sovereign nations.

Just how and when and to what extent the Monroe Doctrine has developed during its life of fourscore years and ten would be a story too long for the telling of it here. But at least some of the steps in its growth may be pointed out, if only to explain why our Republic, which gave it birth, nourished it in infancy and stood ready to defy all the world for the pro-

tection of its youth, now stands aghast in the presence of its gigantic proportions and the infinite potentiality of its maturity. Like certain erstwhile infant industries which now cast their protean shadows athwart the industrial path of our Nation, challenging the best thought of our domestic statesmanship, so the policy embodied in the few words of a presidential message nearly a century ago has outgrown even the Republic's growth and now stands, an over-shadowing, imperative question-mark, in the path of our international relations.

What have been the principles of this giant's growth? Can they now be grafted to the greater advantage of America and the world, upon some more beneficent institution of international life? Such are the questions which confront us, and

which are being pressed more and more closely upon us by the Sphinx of international relations. Let us frankly face them.

Although the branches of the Monroe Doctrine are many in number and stretch forth in many directions, the principles of its growth will be found to be only two. These are, first, the integrity of national territory, and, second, the preservation of popular government.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

The preservation of American territorial integrity has been asserted against Old World acquisitions, whether these take the form of voluntary transfer by one Old World Power to another, or by a New World Power to an Old World Power; or whether they take the form of

colonization, or of acquisition by force of arms.

Transfers of American territory by one Old World Power to another have been prevented on various occasions. More than a century ago, on the 3rd of January, 1811, President Madison addressed the United States Congress in regard to a threat of Great Britain to acquire from Spain a portion of Florida, and in this message he said:

> I recommend to the consideration of Congress the seasonableness of a declaration that the United States could not see, without serious inquietude, any part of a neighboring territory, in which they have in different respects so deep and so just a concern, pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other foreign Power.

Fourteen years later, when the Government of France endeavored to secure from Spain the cession of Cuba and Porto

Rico, Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, sent a dispatch to the American Minister in Paris, in which he said:

> With the hope of guarding beforehand against any possible difficulties on that subject that may arise, you will now add that we could not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European Power than Spain under any circumstances whatever.

Twenty-three years later still, April 29, 1848, when the Indians of Yucatan rebelled against the government of the whites and implored aid and annexation at the hands of the United States, President Polk reiterated the declaration asked for by Madison, in the words:

> Whilst it is not my purpose to recommend the adoption of any measure with a view to the acquisition of the dominion and sovereignty over Yucatan, yet, according to our established policy, we could not consent to a transfer of this dominion and sovereignty either to Spain, Great Britain, or any other European Power.

This declaration has been made on various other occasions since Madison's appeal, and it is now an accepted feature of the Monroe Doctrine that Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark can alienate their American possessions only by ceding them to the United States or by recognizing their independence.

The New World Powers are equally debarred from alienating to Old World governments their territorial possessions in America, and this applies to "Powers" which are no real powers in the international or political sense. For example, in 1848, the Mosquito Indians on the north coast of Nicaragua appealed for aid to Great Britain, whose government not only forced Nicaragua to recognize the independence of the Indian tribes, but

sent its fleets and troops to seize and fortify the port of San Juan del Norte (Greytown). This was regarded as a menace to the trans-Isthmian railway or canal, as well as an infringement upon the Monroe Doctrine, and in response to the protest of the United States, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty embodied the renunciation on the part of both Great Britain and the United States of any acquisition of Central American territory.

The fate of colonial exploitation, which has overtaken Asia and Africa in the nineteenth century, was forestalled in the original document embodying the Monroe Doctrine proper. The famous words of President Monroe, in his message of December 2, 1823, declaring that

> the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and

maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers,

have been repeated on many subsequent official occasions. President Polk gave these words additional meaning by declaring, in his message of December 2, 1845, that

it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established on any part of the North American continent.

The addition in this message of the words "or dominion" to the word "colony" has been interpreted to preclude the acquisition of American land either by colonizing so-called "new lands" or by securing cessions of territory from established governments; and it has been held applicable to any Old World Power,

European or non-European, and to South America as well as North.

The *forcible* acquisition of American territory by Old World Powers has encountered the frequent application or interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, from the time of Madison to the present; and in these later days when, the Old World *governments* having shown no sign of an intention to acquire American lands, either by forcible or by peaceful means, the fear arose in some statesmen's breasts that they might attempt to do so indirectly by means of *corporations* affiliated with them, this latest fancied danger to the Doctrine was promptly faced by a Senate Resolution of 1912. This resolution was introduced by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts when a rumor flew through the land that, if not the Japanese Govern-

ment, at all events a Japanese corporation was about to purchase lands on Magdalena Bay. It forbids any foreign corporation subsidized or controlled by an Old World Government to acquire land in the Americas which is so situated as to menace the safety or communications of the United States. At present, the interpretation or extension of the Monroe Doctrine in this direction has not gone far enough to exclude *all* foreign corporations from doing business on the soil of the Americas, but there is sufficient elasticity in such phraseology for indefinite expansion in the future; and already some foreign corporations are complaining that such is the logical outcome of President Wilson's Mobile declaration against Latin American "concessions."

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY VIOLATED BY THE UNITED STATES

It must be conceded that in these various ways the acquisition of American land by Old World Powers has been comfortably cribbed, cabined, and confined. On the other hand, when Europe showed signs in 1845 of declaring that the Monroe Doctrine was a rule which ought to work *both* ways and forbid the further acquisition of American lands by the United States of America, as well as by Europe, President Polk promptly met these symptoms, in his message of December 2, 1845, by the following emphatic declaration:

> The rapid extension of our settlements over our territories heretofore unoccupied, the addition of new States to our Confederacy, the expansion of free principles, and our rising greatness as a nation are attracting the attention of

the Powers of Europe, and lately the doctrine has been broached in some of them of a "balance of power" on this continent to check our advancement. The United States, sincerely desirous of preserving relations of good understanding with all nations, cannot in silence permit any European interference on the North American continent, and, should any such interference be attempted, will be ready to resist it at any and all hazards. . . . Jealousy among the different sovereigns of Europe lest any one of them might become too powerful for the rest, has caused them anxiously to desire the establishment of what they term the "balance of power." It cannot be permitted to have any application on the North American continent, and especially to the United States. We must ever maintain the principle that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny. Should any portion of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our Confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine without any foreign interposition.

Having thus paved the way for an annexation of territory which should not tear the Monroe Doctrine into fragments,

President Polk entered upon that war with Mexico which the truth-loving participants in it declared was wholly unrighteous, but which ended in the cession to the United States of 125,520 square miles of disputed territory claimed by Texas, and 526,000 square miles of undisputed territory owned by Mexico, or together with Texas itself, an area about seventeen times as large as New York State, with 5000 miles of coast on both oceans and the Gulf and with vast deposits of precious metals. The extraordinary arguments by which President Polk labored to justify the acquisition of this imperial domain are too long to be rehearsed here, although they throw a strong, if lurid, light upon his one-sided interpretation of this feature of the Monroe Doctrine. Their spirit and

quality may be estimated from a few quotations, as follows:

That Congress contemplated the acquisition of territorial indemnity when that body made provision for the prosecution of the war is obvious. The doctrine of no territory is the doctrine of no indemnity, and, if sanctioned, would be a public acknowledgment that our country was wrong and that the war declared by Congress with extraordinary unanimity was unjust and should be abandoned—an admission unfounded in fact and degrading to the national character. The terms of the treaty proposed by the United States were not only just to Mexico, but considering . . . were deemed to be of a most liberal character. The commissioner of the United States was authorized to agree [!] to the establishment of the Rio Grande as the boundary. The boundary of the Rio Grande and the cession to the United States of New Mexico and Upper California constituted an ultimatum which our commission was under no circumstances to yield. That it might be manifest, not only to Mexico, but to all other nations, that the United States were not disposed to take advantage of a feeble power by insisting upon wresting from her all the other Provinces, including many of her principal towns and cities,

which we had conquered and held in our military occupation, but were willing to conclude a treaty in a spirit of liberality, our commissioner was authorized to stipulate for the restoration to Mexico of all our other conquests.

These "liberal" terms were not accepted and the war continued until May 30, 1848, when the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was made. In defense of this treaty and in justification of the war, President Polk wrote the following extraordinary words:

The peace has been concluded on terms the most liberal and magnanimous to Mexico. . . . The results of the war with Mexico have given to the United States a national character abroad which our country never before enjoyed. . . . We shall probably be saved from the necessity of engaging in another foreign war for a long series of years. . . . The extensive and valuable territories ceded by Mexico to the United States constitute indemnity for the past, and the brilliant achievements and signal success of our arms will be a guaranty of security for the future

by convincing all nations that our rights must be respected.

Unfortunately, the seeds of slavery and of civil war sprang up and flourished luxuriantly in the soil which President Polk's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine furnished us with a specious or foolish pretext for annexing, and a half-century elapsed before the national memory was sufficiently dulled or the national conscience was sufficiently salved to enable one recent President to acquire Porto Rico and another to take the Panama zone. The taking of the Panama zone was followed, two years later, by the tardy declaration of the President who "took" it that

There are certain essential points which must never be forgotten as regards the Monroe Doctrine. In the first place, we must as a Nation make it evident that we do not intend to treat

it in any shape or way as an excuse for aggrandizement on our part at the expense of the republics to the south. . . . It must be understood that under no circumstances will the United States use the Monroe Doctrine as a cloak for territorial aggression.[1]

Again, our idealistic President, standing with his feet on the shores of the sea which stretches to the Isthmian Canal, and with his face turned toward our Latin American neighbors, has solemnly declared: "I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest."[2]

Under the leadership of such men as President Wilson, the United States would probably live up to this high standard of national self-denial—for a

[1] President Roosevelt's Message, December 5, 1905.

[2] President Wilson's Mobile Declaration, October 28, 1913.

generation, perhaps, or until it is hurried into another war with or for some member of Latin America, when, still in the name of the "Monroe Doctrine," it might yield to certain clamors which are already being heard and extend its boundary from the Rio Grande to the "natural boundary "of the Panama Canal or even to the Orinoco.

TERRITORIAL AGGRANDIZEMENT IN THE PACIFIC

The interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine which works only one way, has been utilized, also, not only to extend the boundary of the United States southward and eastward, to include parts of Mexico and Colombia and a West India island, but to bring some islands of the Pacific under the Stars and Stripes as

well. In 1842, President Tyler wrote of the Sandwich or Hawaiian Islands, in his annual message to Congress, December 30, 1842, as follows:

> This community, thus existing in the midst of a vast expanse of ocean, should be respected, and all its rights strictly and conscientiously regarded. . . . Far remote from the dominions of European Powers, . . . its near approach to this continent and the intercourse which American vessels have with it, such vessels constituting five-sixths of all which annually visit it, could not but create dissatisfaction on the part of the United States at any attempt by another Power, should such attempt be threatened or feared, to take possession of the islands, colonize them, and subvert the native Government. Considering, therefore, that the United States possesses so large a share of the intercourse with those islands, it is deemed not unfit to make the declaration that their [the United States] Government seeks, nevertheless, no peculiar advantages, no exclusive control over the Hawaiian Government, but is content with its independent existence and anxiously wishes for its security and prosperity. Its forbearance in this respect, under the circumstances of the very large intercourse of their

citizens with the islands, would justify this Government, should events hereafter arise to require it, in making a decided remonstrance against the adoption of an opposite policy by any other Power.

Old World Powers having thus been warned away from the Hawaiian group, "events arose" in the course of the next half-century which induced an American President, despite the honorable, though unpopular, effort of another President to prevent it, to set aside the self-denying ordinance of an earlier time and annex the islands to our Republic's domains. The annexation of the still more remote Philippines, which lie on the threshold of Asia, and which had to be kept at all hazards from the clutches of some Old World Power, is another illustration of that interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine which is equivalent to "heads I win, tails you lose."

The Dominion of Canada, which, under the anti-European interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, could not be ceded by Great Britain to another Old World Power, has not become, in time of peace at least, the object of a serious proposal to apply the pro-United States interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine to it,—although the jest of a certain Speaker of the House of Representatives came perilously near the verge of earnest folly, or foolish earnest, in regard even to Canada. But towards the other points of the compass,—out upon the stormy waves of the Atlantic, beyond the blue waters of the Mexican Gulf and the Caribbean Sea, and far across the vast expanse of the Pacific, has soared the new Monroe Doctrine, impersonating the American eagle itself, one of whose wings beats off

the Old World Powers from any acquisition of "American" territory, while the other brings this territory within the shadow of the Stars and Stripes.

PRESERVATION OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT

Turning from territorial acquisitions to the other principle of the Monroe Doctrine's growth, namely, the preservation of popular government, we find a similar portentous development. Starting with a warning to European Powers that they must not attempt to restore monarchical government in Latin America, it has grown to an announcement to the Latin Americans themselves that they must maintain popular government within the borders of their respective republics. Notice has been served upon them by the United States that the

people must rule with them as with us; and there has been announced to the nearest of our Latin American neighbors what may well become a Pan-American application of Article IV., Section 4, of the United States Constitution, namely:

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this *Hemisphere* a Republican form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), or even without such application, it shall protect them against domestic violence.

From James Monroe to Richard Olney and Woodrow Wilson is a period of only fourscore years; and yet within that lifetime of a single individual, the Monroe Doctrine has attained such mighty dimensions.

We should consider any attempt [said President Monroe in his annual message of December

2, 1823] on the part of European Powers to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

This "system" he defines and rejects in the words:

We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them [the Latin American republics], or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

One year later, December 7, 1824, in his last annual message and as a kind of farewell address to the American people, President Monroe defined the attitude of the United States toward the Latin-Americans' control of their own governments in the words:

These new states are settling down under Governments elective and representative in every branch, similar to our own. In this course we ardently wish them to persevere, under a

firm conviction that it will promote their happiness. In this, their career, however, we have not interfered, believing that every people have a right to institute for themselves the government which, in their judgment, may suit them best. Our example is before them, of the good effect of which, being our neighbors, they are competent to judge, and to their judgment we leave it, in the expectation that other Powers will pursue the same policy. The deep interest which we take in their independence, which we have acknowledged, and in their enjoyment of all the rights incident thereto, especially in the very important one of instituting their own Governments, has been declared, and is known to the world.

Presidents Tyler and Polk reaffirmed this devotion to self-government in Latin America, President Polk declaring, in his annual message, December 2, 1845:

The nations of America are equally sovereign and independent with those of Europe. They possess the same rights, independent of all foreign interposition, to make war, to conclude peace, and to regulate their internal affairs.

As a kind of *obiter dictum* to this declaration, President Polk added: "The American system of government is entirely different from that of Europe." President Pierce declared in his message of 1856:

> It is the established policy of the United States to recognize Governments without question of their source of organization or of the means by which the governing persons attain their power, provided there be a government *de facto* accepted by the people of the country.

President Buchanan, writing to Congress with black despair in his heart in regard to Mexico's incessant anarchy and revolts, in December, 1858, declared: "We have never hitherto interfered directly or indirectly, with its internal affairs." How far beyond this point the Monroe Doctrine has grown in recent years—and largely because of Mexico's troubles,—is known to all who read or run.

The Dominican Republic, during our own Civil War, furnished another illustration both of our policy of non-intervention in the governmental affairs of the Latin Americans and of our policy of preventing intervention on the part of Europe. Pedro Santana, making himself dictator of the island Republic in 1861, invited Spain to resume its former sovereignty, and Spain responded by sending a small body of troops. The islanders appealed to the United States for protection; but our Civil War prevented more than a remonstrance being made to Spain, while political troubles in Madrid prevented Spain from taking effective control of the island. When, in 1865, the Spanish troops were withdrawn, the Santo Domingans declared:

The United Dominican People, without regard to rank or color, have planted the white cross of the republic on the principle enunciated by the Great Mother of free nations, that America belongs to the Americans, and we will endure all our trials over again sooner than desert it.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A single generation elapsed and behold a great change had come over the spirit of this feature of the Monroe Doctrine. The Secretary of State of the first Democratic President since the Civil War declared: "The United States is practical sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interposition." Mr. Olney's use of the word "continent" was far too modest, for since he was discussing the Venezuelan question, he meant and should have said that the United States

is practical sovereign in this hemisphere. Acting upon his Secretary's declaration, President Cleveland demanded, not only that Great Britain should arbitrate its boundary dispute with Venezuela, but that the *United States* should act as the arbitrator of the dispute and enforce its decision, if need be, by war.

In President McKinley's administration, the Platt Amendment was applied to Cuba and provided that Cuba shall make no treaties with foreign governments tending to destroy its independence or territorial integrity, that Cuba shall contract no public debts beyond its ordinary revenue, and that the United States Government may intervene to protect Cuban independence and to maintain a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty.

President Roosevelt ordered a United States naval commander in the Dominican Republic to prevent any revolutionists from menacing the customs-houses of the Republic; the commander carried out these instructions, and after the revolution was ended, the United States appointed the collectors of the customs-house revenue and distributed it between the creditors and the Government; in the interests, of course, of "peace and prosperity."

The Constitution [of the United States] [says Mr. Roosevelt] did not explicitly give me power to bring about the necessary agreement with Santo Domingo; but the Constitution did not forbid my doing what I did. I put the agreement into effect, and I continued its execution for two years before the Senate acted. . . . The Senate adjourned without any action at all. . . . I went ahead and administered the proposed treaty anyhow, considering it a simple agreement on the part of the Executive which would be

converted into a treaty whenever the Senate acted.

All of which throws a significant sidelight upon popular government both in the Dominican Republic and in the United States.

President Taft continued the Roosevelt policy in the Dominican Republic, suppressing one revolution and preventing another, causing one President to resign and protecting his successor in office, and continuing to collect and distribute the customs. In Nicaragua, President Taft went still farther in the development of the "Monroe Doctrine." He forced the resignation of President Zelaya; refused to recognize the successor whom the people selected, and supported the revolutionists who finally drove him into exile; landed in the country 2350 United

States marines, who captured five towns, suppressed another revolution under General Mena, who had been chosen president by the Congress, secured President Diaz in his chair, distributed food supplies to the victims of the war, and left four hundred marines "on guard" in the Republic's capital city. President Taft's justification of these measures was "the protection of the life and property of United States citizens and the influencing in all appropriate ways the restoration of lawful and orderly government."

Senator Bacon, the present Democratic Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, introduced a resolution into the Senate forbidding the use of the United States military forces in lands not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and declaring President

Taft's action in Nicaragua an act of war, which is expressly forbidden by the Constitution unless authorized by Congress. But under the present Democratic administration of President Wilson, the United States marines have been used to prevent another revolution under Mena; and there has been negotiated a treaty, which is now pending in the Senate, which provides (in the spirit of the Platt Amendment) that Nicaragua shall declare war only with the consent of the United States, that no treaties shall be made with foreign governments tending to destroy Nicaraguan independence or to give foreign governments footholds on Nicaraguan soil, that no public debts shall be contracted beyond Nicaragua's ordinary revenue, and that the United States Government may intervene to protect

Nicaraguan independence and to help carry out the financial obligations of Nicaragua to the extent of supervising the collection of its revenues and the disbursement of a sum of money to be paid by the United States to Nicaragua for a certain *quid pro quo*. This sum of $3,000,000 is to be paid for the exclusive right to dig a canal across Nicaragua, for a ninety-nine years' lease of a naval base in the Bay of Fonseca, and a ninety-nine years' lease of the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean Sea. The "protectorate" thus sought is designed to preserve the integrity of Nicaragua's territory against foreign aggression, to strengthen its finances, to maintain a stable government, and, from the two naval bases, to prevent or suppress revolutions in Nicaragua, Honduras, Salva-

dor or any other Central American or Caribbean Republic.

In the West Indies, President Wilson's youthful administration has already enforced a fair trial for Cuban delinquents, and sent commissioners "to observe" a presidential election in the Dominican Republic. While in Mexico, it has refused to recognize Huerta as provisional president, has compelled him to hold an election for a new president, and has refused to recognize him as elected on the face of the returns declaring him to be the successful candidate. Finally, that great Democratic idealist, President Wilson, has declared[1]:

> There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until General Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority in Mexico; until it is understood on all hands, indeed, that such pretended governments will not be countenanced or

[1] Annual Message to the Congress, December 2, 1913.

dealt with by the Government of the United States. We are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions.

I desire at this point to affirm my hearty sympathy, admiration, and gratitude for President Wilson's magnificent attempt to teach the Mexicans, our own fellow-countrymen, and the world, that in this twentieth century the strength of diplomatic, commercial, and financial forces is quite sufficient to solve a knotty international problem, without the necessity of resorting to the antiquated and barbarous forces of warfare.

RESULTS OF THE NEW MONROE DOCTRINE

I do not accuse; I merely state the plain facts as to the portentous dimensions of the Monroe Doctrine of our time. It is not a question of what it was in the

beginning, or of what it ought to be, but of what actual events show it to have become. Its consequences, present and future, are truly appalling. Some of its past applications and the possibilities of its applications in the future have done more than everything else put together to alienate our neighbors, whom Secretary Olney declared to be by geographical proximity, by national sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions, our friends and allies, commercially and politically. The Latin American fear of the new Monroe Doctrine is greatly retarding our mutual commerce and causing profound and widespread international distrust. The vast sums expended upon our Navy are occasioned predominantly by a determination to defend the Monroe Doctrine at all haz-

ards.[1] Our sensitiveness concerning it has sown suspicion and ill-will between the United States and Germany, and the United States and Japan. The Senate's refusal to ratify President Taft's great treaties of general arbitration with Great Britain and France was based chiefly upon their supposed antipathy to the Monroe Doctrine; and the evident intention of the Congress to stand by the Panama Tolls Exemption Clause, despite the plain prohibition of such clause by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, is a practical and pernicious application of President Roosevelt's theory that the Monroe Doctrine "is really a guaranty

[1] President Roosevelt, an expert in the expansion of the Monroe Doctrine and of the Navy alike, declares: "The Navy offers us the only means of making our insistence upon the Monroe Doctrine anything but a subject of derision to whatever nation chooses to disregard it." (Message of December 3, 1901.)

of the commercial independence of the Americas."[1]

This doctrine, which warns off Old World Powers, but enables us to annex American lands at our good pleasure, and which points to this as the *easiest* method of solving the knotty problems to the south of us, carries with it the possibility of stretching our jurisdiction to the Panama Canal, to the Orinoco, to the Strait of Magellan, and even of making the South Pole correspond with the Aurora Borealis as our national boundary! This doctrine, which requires us to champion popular government in Latin America, even though the Latin Americans themselves may be indifferent to it;

[1] This application of the "Monroe Doctrine" as opposed to international good faith was finally defeated, and the Exemption Clause was repealed, under the leadership of President Wilson and after a bitter struggle in both houses of the new Congress.

which requires us to demand the abdication of a despot and even to refuse him the right of election at the polls; which enables Old World governments, and even Old World corporations, to appeal to us for the protection of their subjects or employes and their property in Latin America, bears a fine promise of making us the ubiquitous policeman of the Western World. This doctrine, which enables the Old World to demand that *our* big stick be used to prevent inhumanity in the rubber-fields of Peru or Bolivia, and enables our own industrial combinations to demand that their foreign rivals shall be prevented from securing concessions in Colombian and other Latin American oil-fields, bids fair to constitute the United States the international be-all and do-all of one-half the globe. Is this in very

truth to be our country's mission? The shades of Washington and of Don Quixote alike arise to forbid it; and many considerations far more substantial point in a wholly different direction towards America's genuine mission. Such, then, is the problem of the Monroe Doctrine of our time.

And, now, what are its solutions? Shall we take advantage of some Algeciras or Congo conference, and, by procuring a slice of some African jungle, barter it and our influence for Europe's and Japan's definite recognition of the Monroe Doctrine as an accepted axiom of international law? The Old World having thus been disposed of, shall we continue alone our policy of extending protectorates over the republics of the West Indies and Central America and finally of

South America as well? Shall we invite Argentine, Brazil, and Chile, or Great Britain, Germany, and France, to form with us an alliance which will divide the responsibility and distribute the burden of enforcing the *Pax Americana* in the Caribbean Sea? Shall the new Monroe Doctrine be repressed within the strait-jacket which confined its original? Shall the doctrine, new and old, be declared an obsolete shibboleth, and the whole thing be thrown overboard from our ship of state, leaving the Latin Americans to protect themselves as best they may by means of their own resources and such international alliances as they can make? Or, finally, shall the United States take another grand and noble stride along the path of the new internationalism, and place its Pan-American problem, which

is in reality a Pan-Human problem, in the hands of the entire family of nations, represented by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague?

II

SEVEN PROPOSED SOLUTIONS[1]

WE Americans in discussing the Monroe Doctrine appear to be concerned chiefly with the growth and present scope of the doctrine itself, and seldom, if ever, pause to consider the reasons why the United States undertook and continues to enforce it by its own unsupported sanction. It is the object of this contribution to the great debate to consider chiefly the major premise of the accepted conclusion, and to examine the *Monroe*, or national,

[1] An address at the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, held in Washington, D. C., April 24, 1914.

sanction of the doctrine, rather than the doctrine itself. In other words, the writ of *quo warranto* having been issued against the United States, let us frankly respond to the summons to show why our country alone, rather than the family of nations as a whole, or several members of it at the least, should be bearing the burden in our own and the world's behoof.

As a preliminary to this discussion, it is essential to state as concisely as possible the present status of the doctrine. In the first place, its *terminus ad quem* has been changed or greatly broadened. Directed at first against Spain and the Holy Alliance, it has become a warning to the governments of Europe, Asia, and Latin America as well—for the whole world, indeed,—to heed and obey.

From the territorial point of view, it

began with an assertion of America's territorial integrity against European acquisitions either by force or by colonization; but it now prevents the voluntary transfers of American soil by Old World Powers to other Old World Powers, by New World Powers to Old World Powers, and doubtless, if the case should arise, by New World Powers to other New World Powers. In these days of large corporations, also, it has been made to forbid any foreign corporation subsidized or controlled by an Old World government to acquire land in the Americas which is so situated as to menace the safety or communications of the United States. At present, the interpretation or extension of the doctrine in this direction has not gone far enough to exclude *all* foreign corporations from doing business on the

soil of the Americas; but there is sufficient elasticity in such phraseology for indefinite expansion in the future, and already some foreigners are complaining that such is the logical outcome of President Wilson's Mobile declaration against Latin American "concessions."

From the point of view of American self-government, the doctrine began with a declaration against the restoration to Latin America of the monarchical government of Spain. Its author condemned, however, any intervention on the part of the United States in favor of a republican form of government; and this condemnation was repeated by his successors, even including President Polk, who in most matters far out-Monroed Monroe. But within the past two decades, our self-restraint in this particular has been cast

to the winds. One of our most highly esteemed secretaries of state—intoxicated, possibly, by the exuberance of a temporary pugnacity—declared that "the United States is practical sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interposition." Every administration since that time has made popular government of the fiat variety one of its specialties in dealing with Latin America.

In President McKinley's Administration, the Platt Amendment was applied to Cuba to protect the new Republic against any hankering on its part after the fleshpots of Spain or other European monarchies, by providing that Cuba should make no treaties with foreign governments tending to destroy its independence or territorial integrity and should contract

no public debts disproportionate to its ordinary revenue, and that the United States should or might intervene to protect Cuban independence and to maintain a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty.

In President Roosevelt's Administration, we insisted that a province of Colombia should exercise the divine right of revolution; at the same time we prevented the mother country from exercising its right of coercion over its recalcitrant daughter, and we speedily recognized and permanently guaranteed, for a substantial *quid pro quo*, the independence of the new Republic. In the same Administration, also, the Big Stick was raised to conserve popular government in the Dominican Republic, this time by preventing revolutionists

from looting the custom-houses for their sinews of war, and, after the rebellion was suppressed, by collecting and distributing the revenues so as to prevent other revolts and to forestall foreign Shylocks from demanding their pound of flesh in the form of Dominican lands.

In President Taft's Administration, the Roosevelt policy in the Dominican Republic was continued, one revolt was suppressed and another prevented, one President was compelled to resign and his successor was sustained—contrary to Napoleon's dictum[1]—on the points of American bayonets, while American appointees continued to collect and administer the customs. Nicaragua's popular Government, also, was the recipient of

[1] "You can do anything with bayonets, except sit on them."

President Taft's particular attentions. One President was forced to resign; his successor, whom the people thought they had elected, was refused recognition, and a revolt against him was supported by 2350 United States marines, who drove him into exile, placed a third President in the chair, captured five of the Republic's towns, suppressed another revolt, distributed food supplies to the victims of the war, and left four hundred marines "on guard" in the Republic's capital city. All this was justified on the plea of "the protection of the life and property of United States citizens and the influencing in all appropriate ways the restoration of lawful and orderly government."

In the present Administration, a treaty is said to be pending between the United

States and Nicaragua which, if ratified, will make the latter Republic a veritable "protectorate" of our own and a base of naval operations, also, against domestic revolts, foreign land-grabbers, and European creditors in the other Central American republics. The enforcement of a fair trial of political offenders in Cuba, the "supervision" of Dominican elections, and in Mexico, the refusal to recognize Huerta, an enforced presidential election, and the rejection of the electoral returns, are all too recent to need more than a mere mention. In view of such achievements as these by an Administration only one year of age, we must all recognize grave significance in President Wilson's declaration in his first annual message that "we are the friends of constitutional government in America;

we are more than its friends, we are its champions."

Thus, not only in our own dependencies, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, but in our neighboring republics, which are nominally independent, our Government has become the schoolmaster in the science and art of popular government. Jefferson's and Monroe's confidence in democracy has grown into a determination that our neighbors in the Western World shall enjoy for themselves, *nolens volens*, the blessings of constitutional government, even if we are obliged to blow these blessings upon them from the guns of super-dreadnoughts.

When it is suggested that this enterprise upon which we are engaged is a rather quixotic one, that it is in fact a superlatively and preposterously altruis-

tic one for a mere government to be engaged in, the reply which has hitherto proved sufficient is, that popular government and financial solidity are essential to Latin America's political stability, that political stability is the *sine qua non* of its territorial integrity, and that its territorial integrity is imperatively demanded by the Monroe Doctrine for the safety and peace of the United States.

I. SHALL IT BE WHOLLY RELINQUISHED?

We Americans who have grown restive under the heavy burden of the Monroe Doctrine, have sought for some means of evading or lessening our country's responsibility, and sundry alternatives have been suggested. Some have roundly denounced it as an "obsolete shibboleth" and demanded that the United States

throw it overboard from its ship of state, leaving Latin America to shift for itself, on its own resources, or with such defensive alliances as it can make in the New World or the Old. But in the present state of world politics, this policy of scuttle is rejected by the majority of Americans as fraught with certain peril to Latin America and to the United States as well. Not only is the specter of Old World territorial aggrandizement in the New World, with its military consequences to ourselves, seen in this policy of relinquishment, but the hope of efficient popular government throughout Latin America would be relinquished with it. If left entirely to themselves, it appears too optimistic to cherish, for most of these republics, the hope which President Wilson expressed for

Mexico in his first annual message as follows:

> And then, when the end comes [after Civil War has ceased], we shall hope to see constitutional order restored in distressed Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions.

Ambition, ignorance, and lack of political training would long continue to retard the permanent adoption of constitutional government.

2. SHALL IT BE REDUCED TO ITS ORIGINAL PROPORTIONS?

If, then, say other sincere critics, the United States must continue to bear the burden of the Monroe Doctrine, let us at least repress it within the strait-jacket of its modest original. The prevention of Old World conquest or colonization,

and the prevention of the restoration of monarchical government, in Latin America, are surely sufficient for the safety of the United States and are as much as Latin America can expect at our hands. But *nulla vestigia retrorsum* is the law here as elsewhere in national development; and in these days of complex civilization, conquest, colonization, and monarchical government assume such subtle forms that eternal vigilance or constant watchful waiting on the part of the United States is held to be the price of America's freedom from them. Through the doorways of national bonds, of industrial concessions, of land companies and of special privileges of many kinds, may come those old enemies of the Holy Alliance era whom Jefferson and Monroe so valiantly resisted.

3. SHALL IT SECURE RECOGNITION AS INTERNATIONAL LAW?

Let us, then, say a third class of critics, bargain with those Old World Powers from whom, in our enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, we are supposed to have most to fear,—Germany and Japan, for example,—and secure their formal recognition of the doctrine not as a mere national policy, but as genuine international law. We have secured partial and sporadic recognition of it by some of the European Powers; let us induce them, by giving them some suitable *quid pro quo* —such as the Philippines, or tariff concession—to yield it once for all their formal acceptance. But students of the history of our country need not be reminded that our chief national character-

istics and instincts are opposed to such international bargaining; while students of the history of international law need not be reminded that so-called international law which is based on such partial and selfish agreements is as unstable as the shifting sand of the desert or the shore.

4. SHALL A CONCERT OF THE GREAT POWERS SUPPORT IT?

Let us, then, say still other critics, make a direct alliance with the Great Powers of Europe—Great Britain, Germany, and France—for the enforcement of the doctrine. If we cannot make it genuine international law, let us continue it as a national policy and make an alliance for its support with those European Powers which are most interested

in it and which are best able to render support to it. The advocates of this plan are not Americans alone. A member of the British House of Commons,[1] who is traveling in our country at the present time, has recently said:

> We are one people and of one blood. Our King came from Germany; and I hope to see an alliance between England, Germany, and the United States, with the entente with France maintained.

These are friendly sentiments; but, aside from the probable cost of such alliances as these, they run counter to our national antipathy, which has been firmly rooted ever since Washington's Farewell Address, to entangling alliances; and they run counter to that strong and ever increasing current of world-

[1] Rev. C. Silvester Horne, M.P. for Ipswich.

wide internationalism which is so marked a characteristic of our era, and which is opposed to partial alliances of every kind and degree.

5. SHALL AN A. B. C. ALLIANCE SUPPORT IT?

Again, it is suggested with growing insistency that if not with the strongest of the Old World Powers, then surely with the strongest and most stable of the New World Powers, "the A. B. C. Powers" (Argentine, Brazil, and Chile), for example, we can make an alliance for the enforcement of a distinctively American policy. This suggestion is a revival of President Jefferson's plan of 1809 to form through General Wilkinson an alliance between the United States, Spanish America, and Brazil. It is a revival under

greatly changed and more favorable circumstances, of course; but it would be in this twentieth century an example of atavism, of reversion to the barbarous diplomacy of the Middle Age. For the very reason that the Monroe Doctrine is a policy which vitally concerns *all* of the twenty-one American republics, its interpretation and enforcement may not justly be left to any partial "concert" of a few of them. The injustice to the weaker Powers, and the lack of harmony among the allied Powers themselves, which must be anticipated from any such "American Concert," may be estimated from the history of the "Holy Alliance" and the "Concert of Europe." With the growth of the Latin American Powers, such a course would lead in time to the institution in this hemisphere of the precarious

and portentous condition of affairs in the Old World with its triple and dual alliances, and its *ententes*, which are cordial only toward their own members and menacing toward all outsiders. Again, such a "Concert of America" would necessarily be on equal terms, or it would be dominated by the United States. If on equal terms, its object would be inevitably frustrated, by disagreement both as to what should be done and as to who should do it. The recognition by Brazil of Maximilian's government in Mexico, and Chile's impression of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine in the United States' collection of the Alsop Claim are two out of many illustrations of the inevitable disagreements which would ensue under any such quadruple alliance. If the "Concert" be dominated

by the United States, even though only for the sake of prompt decision and effective enforcement, the A. B. C. Powers would naturally regard it as only one more and the most galling of all the evidences of the "Yankee Peril," which the A. B. C. was formed primarily to combat.

Foreign nations would inevitably regard the alliance of the United States with a selected few of its Latin American neighbors as an illustration of the lion and the lambs lying down together—with the lambs inside; and they would also regard it as being much to the detriment of the lion's digestion and prestige among the other beasts of the jungle. A distinguished London journalist,[1] who is a representative of his paper in this country, has frankly declared that such a sugges-

[1] Mr. A. Maurice Low, of the London *Morning Post.*

tion is rank cowardice, a confession of weakness which a great nation like ours has no right to make; and he assured his audience that Great Britain would never be dictated to by Latin Americans, even though allied with the United States.

6. SHALL PAN-AMERICA SUPPORT IT?

The distinguished Director-General of the Bureau of American Republics has broadened the A. B. C. suggestion to include *all* of Latin America and to substitute the "Pan-American," for the "Monroe," Doctrine. This is a revival of Bolivar's dream of a Pan-American amphictyonic council, sitting at Panama, and checking the nefarious designs of the Holy Alliance. Pan-Hellenism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism are thus to be

followed by Pan-Americanism.[1] But if too much lamb might impair the lion's digestion, what might be expected from the addition of so many mice—and mice of a peculiarly tough and indigestible quality? The Latin Americans themselves would probably object to the achievement of such a meal: "But not on us, the oysters said" (in response to the supper-invitation of the Walrus), "and they shed a salty tear." For the relations of our Republic toward many of its neighbors in the past have partaken too much of that policy which has been graphically described as "a quick succession of kicks and kindness" to make such a proposal acceptable in entire confidence.

[1] Another recent illustration of the Pan-Americanism abroad in the land is a suggestion by Senator Falls, of New Mexico, that *all* American coastwise commerce be exempt from the payment of Panama Canal tolls.

Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Chile, even Haiti, might be suspicious of entering into an alliance on unequal terms with the American Eagle whose talons have been felt more than once on their soil. As for an alliance with them on equal terms: it would seem better to throw the Monroe Doctrine overboard at once and invite Chaos to climb on board and thus avoid the long and poignant agony which would inevitably intervene before that goddess eventually took command.

7. SHALL UNCLE SAM CONTINUE TO "GO IT ALONE"?

What alternative, then, is left? If the Monroe Doctrine is not to be declared obsolete and to be utterly discarded; if it cannot now, in face of the imperative demands of twentieth-century civilization,

be repressed within the strait-jacket of its modest original; if no attempt should be made to induce the great Powers of Europe to give their formal assent to the United States' enforcement of it, and if no alliance with them should be made to aid the United States in its enforcement; if an "American Concert," including the United States and the A. B. C. Powers, be impracticable and undesirable, and even more impracticable and undesirable a Pan-American Concert —what other refuge is there?

There are two alternatives left, namely, the strictly *national*, and the genuinely international, or what I have ventured elsewhere to call the *supranational*,[1] sanction of the principles involved in it.

[1] *Cf.* an address on "The Primary Sources of International Obligations," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law* at its Fifth Annual Meeting, Washington, D. C., 1911 (pp. 280–288).

The advocates of the strictly national enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, of its enforcement by the United States alone, form very probably at present the great majority of our fellow countrymen; but this majority is daily decreasing as the logic of accumulating events is brought irresistibly home to them. Of course, "we've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money, too"; and if put to it, we can still, doubtless, "lick all creation."

But the process of keeping constantly prepared for so animated a struggle is found to be increasingly expensive, and a resort to an income tax in a time of profound peace for the purpose of enabling us to expend two-thirds of the annual revenue on military objects is not greatly relished by the large and intelligent part of our citizenship upon whom the tax falls.

Our merchants and financiers who deal with Latin America are increasingly aware that the United States' individual responsibility for the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine lies like a lion across the path of their future opportunities for doing an increasing business with our rapidly developing neighbors; and they find, too, that their Old World competitors in these fields are utilizing the unpopularity of our Government's policy to secure the lion's share of railroad and other concessions and of the foreign commerce. The growing importance of a foreign market as a stimulus and outlet for our domestic industry is being appreciated so keenly by our chambers of commerce that they are making their voice heard in favor of the repeal of the Panama Tolls Exemption Clause; the

light of a similar experience may be expected to dawn upon them in no distant future from the problem of the Monroe Doctrine as well.

Meanwhile, the upper branch of our Congress, less sensitive at present to changes in public opinion than is the lower branch, advances the necessity of preserving sacred the Monroe Doctrine as a reason for rejecting any such policy of "truckling" to Great Britain and the other commercial nations of the Old World as is discovered in the repeal of the Tolls Exemption Clause. Still more menacing to our responsbility for the Monroe Doctrine were considered the general arbitration treaties of 1911 with Great Britain and France, and the Senate accordingly rejected them.

Unfortunately, the Senate's determina-

tion that no degree of arbitration—not even the *compromis* clause in greatly restricted general treaties—shall be permitted to infringe upon our monopoly of the Monroe Doctrine persists side by side with, and is the prime cause of, the suspicion and ill-will which burst forth from time to time between our country and such natural and traditional friends as Germany and Japan.

This sensitiveness as to the safety of the Monroe Doctrine has not brought with it a corresponding backwardness in claiming all the rights and privileges pertaining to it. For example, neither Old World Powers nor other American republics, besides the one sole champion of the Monroe Doctrine, may be permitted to share in the building, ownership, or control of any canal between the Atlan-

tic and the Pacific. The right of fortifying the Panama Canal has been followed by the assertion that we have also the right to discriminate in favor of our own ships passing through it,—the diplomatic history of seventy years and the existence of a precise treaty to the contrary notwithstanding.

A leetle country never misconstrues a treaty with a big one [says the Albany philosopher[1]]; that is contrary to self-preservation and the law of nations. A leetle country allus construes a treaty with a big one jest the same from fust to last, strictly in accordance with its original meanin' an' intent; but a big nation ain't so gol blamed hide-bound ner bigoted, not by a long sight. If we ever want anything down in Guatemala that we can't git except with the aid of a handful o' blue-jackets an' a marine band, we'll discover a reason fer landin' 'em [and that will probably be the Monroe Doctrine]; we'll dig up a reserve clause in a peace protocol

[1] "Epaphroditus Small," *alias* Simon Creel (see the New York *Sun*, April 3, 1914).

[or the Monroe Doctrine] that can only be interpreted one way in the light of human progress.

Since we insist on the exclusive possession of the *rights* entailed by the doctrine, the Old World naturally demands that we shall assume the corresponding duties. Its governments accordingly invoke our protection for the lives and property of their citizens in the not infrequent times of Latin American revolt and disorder; its corporations make a similar demand; its merchants insist that we shall suppress civil warfare in the interest of neutral commerce; and its peoples assume that it is our duty to put an end to the inhumanity which may be discovered in the rubber-fields of Peru or Bolivia. The Latin American governments, also, have kept us tolerably busy in defending their only available assets, namely, their cus-

tom-houses and territory from the pressing claims of the Old World creditors; and even our own industrial corporations are demanding that our Government shall intervene in their behalf against their Old World rivals, lest the latter should infringe upon the Monroe Doctrine by securing concessions from Latin American governments which might place those governments under foreign control, or which might prevent valuable deposits of oil from finding their natural destiny in the tanks of United States warships, the chief object of which is to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, largely in Latin America's behalf. Thus runs the argument in its vicious circle.

So elastic has this doctrine become under the strain of twentieth-century cosmopolitanism that so good a friend

of our country as the President of the Argentine Republic has characterized it as being made of gutta-percha.[1] So indefinite has it become in consequence of our country's attempt to make it apply to every new international emergency, that no jurist or publicist outside of our own country can satisfactorily define it; and it is much to be doubted if we can do so ourselves. When it is finally laid to rest, its epitaph may well be: Here lies one whose name was writ in water.

From the point of view of our own Republican form of government, the assumption by our Government of the exclusive enforcement of the doctrine is open to serious question. The American Revolution was due to Great Britain's

[1] Dr. R. Saenz Peña, in the first volume of his *Memoirs*, Buenos Aires, 1914.

adoption of an exaggerated Monroe Doctrine in dealing with its colonies. The Declaration of Independence is opposed to the claim of one nation to coerce the political status of another. Senator Hoar declared in a memorable address:

> I maintain that holding in subjection an alien people, governing them against their will for any fancied advantage to them, is not only not an end provided for by the Constitution, but it is an end prohibited therein.

The Constitution established a government of, by, and for the people of the *United States*, and certainly did not provide for a paternalistic government of foreign peoples. Article IV., Section 4, of the Constitution was never designed to read:

> The United States shall guarantee to every State in this *hemisphere* a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature

cannot be convened), or even without such application, it shall protect them against domestic violence.

Our first President's strict appeal for obedience to the Constitution was so far forgotten by a recent President that, as he himself admits, "I took the Canal Zone and left Congress to debate, not the Canal, but me"; and again:

> The Constitution did not explicitly give me power to bring about the necessary agreement with Santo Domingo [to collect and administer that Republic's revenues]; but the Constitution did not forbid my doing what I did. I put the agreement into effect, and I continued its execution two years before the Senate acted. . . . The Senate adjourned without any action at all. . . . I went ahead and administered the proposed treaty anyhow, considering it a simple agreement on the part of the Executive which would be converted into a treaty whenever the Senate acted.

Thus near the verge of imperialism, at home as well as abroad, has the Monroe

Doctrine and our exclusive administration of it brought us. It is small wonder that the Senate should have struggled with the Executive so ardently under President Roosevelt's Administration, and that similar acts on the part of his successor caused the late Democratic chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations to introduce a resolution in the Senate forbidding the use of the United States' military forces in lands not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

Such are the insuperable and increasing difficulties, the fundamental objections, to the strictly national, or the United States go-it-alone, policy of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. This solution of the problem is no longer tolerable, either in itself or in its consequences. The hand-

writing on the wall, predicting its relinquishment, and the advancing shadow of its successor, are already to be seen. Not that the eternal principles of right and justice which underlie the doctrine are passing; but that the enforcement of these principles on the sole responsibility of a single one of the forty-six members of the family of nations is tottering to its fall. *Le roi est mort; vive le roi!* The preservation of the integrity of national territory and the maintenance of popular government can never be surrendered; but they can and must be placed under the ægis of the entire family of nations and of a truly international court of justice.

III

THE HAGUE SOLUTION[1]

TO criticize the Monroe Doctrine is regarded by many of our good fellow countrymen as being in the same class of heinous crimes against American patriotism as would be the condemnation of the Declaration of Independence, the annulment of the Constitution, or the abrogation of the Proclamation of Emancipation. It is vigorously denied that there is any *problem* at all connected with it, either in its interpreta-

[1] An address at the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, May 28, 1914.

tion or in its enforcement. But the unadorned facts of our international relations during the past score of years make it plain to the wayfaring man who reads as he runs that the problem does exist and is growing ever greater.

The doctrine, receiving the modest name of its reputed father, began its career nearly a century ago as a sign-board for the Holy Alliance, warning off that moribund and long since defunct coterie of the effete monarchies of Europe from any attempted colonization of American territory or restoration of Spain's monarchical government over Spanish America. From this relatively small acorn, it has grown into the mighty oak which now casts its shadow around the world. All of Europe and the Powers of Asia and of Latin America as well have

been summoned by it to stop, look, listen, and obey.

The territorial aspect of the doctrine has come to include a prohibition of the acquisition of American soil by means of colonization, by force, or by voluntary transfer by the four Old World Powers possessing American territory to other Old World Powers, by New World Powers to Old World Powers, and, probably, by New World Powers to other New World Powers. In application of the Roosevelt-ian theory that the Monroe Doctrine "is really a guaranty of the commercial independence of the Americas," the United States has warned off Old World Powers from the acquisition of any of the six interoceanic canal routes; the Senate has adopted a resolution forbidding any corporation subsidized or controlled by an

Old World government to acquire lands in the Americas which are so situated as to menace the safety or communications of the United States; and the President, in his "Mobile Declaration," has given warning against the Latin American policy of granting "concessions" to foreign corporations.

Meanwhile, the United States has applied this assertion of territorial integrity in the Americas in a wholly one-sided way, that is, against all *other* nations, excluding itself. It has extended its talons eastward into the Atlantic Ocean and annexed Porto Rico; it has cut off territory seventeen times as large as New York State from Mexico, and has "taken" the Canal Zone; and it has reached out westward across the vast Pacific and annexed Samoa, the Hawaiian

Isles, and the Philippines on the very threshold of Asia.

The governmental aspect of the doctrine has grown from a veto by the United States on the restoration of the Spanish monarchy in America, and a self-denying ordinance against its own interference with Latin American governments, to include an extraordinarily far-reaching program of political activity. It has caused the cessation of Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; it has established by the Platt Amendment its right of intervention in Cuba to protect that Republic's independence and to maintain in it a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty; it has protected the right of revolution in Panama, and guaranteed the independence of that Republic, while at

the same time it prevented by armed force the right of Colombia to suppress what was from the Colombian point of view a rebellion and not a revolution; it has decided against rebellions in the Dominican Republic and in Nicaragua, and has suppressed them by means of its warships and its marines; it has negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua for the conversion of that Republic into a protectorate of the United States and a base of operations against incipient rebellions in all of the Central American republics; it has put down one President and set up another in Santo Domingo; driven out one President, refused recognition to another, suppressed him, placed a third in the presidential chair, and left a body of marines to guard him, in Nicaragua; and in Mexico it has refused recognition

to Huerta, compelled him to hold a presidential election, refused him permission to be a candidate in it, rejected the electoral returns, and watchfully waited for him to retire; it has "supervised" the elections in one West India Republic, and prevented the government of another from pardoning prisoners accused of looting the treasury; and, to protect the financial status, and thus preserve stable government, in these republics, it has collected and distributed the customs-dues and forbidden the contracting of public debts beyond the ordinary revenue.

It is small wonder that in view of such a program as this the consistent application of the doctrine of popular sovereignty and self-government should have been lost sight of by the public servants of our own land, and that a distinguished Re-

publican should have gone ahead regardless of the Constitution and rough ridden over the Senate, in order to carry it out; or that one eminent Democrat should have declared that "the United States is practical sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interposition," while another Democrat, even more eminent, should have declared that "we are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends: we are its *champions.*"

The rest of the world has lost patience with our attempts to square our international practice with our political theory, or to stretch our theory to cover our practice, and make diverse demands upon us. Old World governments demand that, if we will not permit them to

protect their subjects' lives and property, we must do so ourselves; Old World corporations demand that we shall use our own big stick to protect their employees and investments; Old World sentiment demands that we shall suppress inhumanity in the rubber-fields of Bolivia and Peru; our own corporations demand that our Government shall back them up in their competition with Old World corporations in the struggle for "concessions," and support them with our dreadnoughts in the collection of their claims upon Latin America; the Latin Americans distrust us as "the great Yankee peril of the North," and yield to the financial and industrial persuasions of European, rather than to those of American, merchants and financiers; and our own solicitude for the "Monroe

Doctrine" leads us to interpret every move—commercial, naval, or otherwise—on the part of our natural and traditional friends, Germany and Japan, as a veiled or open attack upon us, and induces us to collect an income tax in time of profound peace and to convert two-thirds of our national income into armaments on land and sea.

Confronted by these indisputable facts, the most doubting of Thomases must admit that the Monroe Doctrine has become a great and ever growing problem. The existence and gravity of this problem are shown by the fact that at least seven solutions of it are being ardently advocated. The scope of this address will not permit a review of these proposed solutions, but they may be at least mentioned, if only to suggest their inadequacy, or

their preparatory character as leading up to what appeals to me as the ultimate, adequate, and wholly desirable one.

Those critics who have become most impatient with the evils which the Doctrine has entailed demand that it be thrown overboard from our Republic's ship of state, and that our Latin American neighbors be permitted or compelled to shift for themselves and—the Devil take the hindmost! It is only the recent developments of the Doctrine, say others, that have caused our present ills; therefore let us curtail this new Monroe Doctrine, just behind its ears, and leave only its original head and front of opposition to European colonization and intervention in Latin America. The new Doctrine, say a third class, is the logical development of the old, made necessary

by the complex intimacies of modern international life; hence it must be borne, and we, the people of the United States, must bear it as of yore—grin though we may and arm though we must. The increasing burden and responsibility of the Doctrine, say others, should at least cause it to be transformed from a mere national policy into generally accepted international law; let us, then, they insist, secure the Old World's formal sanction of it, by means of individual or collective bargaining for it with the great Powers of Europe and Asia. Let us go farther still, is a fifth suggestion, and add to their formal sanction of it as international law their definite promise to aid us in its enforcement. No, reply the opponents of this policy of entangling alliances with Old World Powers, it is a doctrine which

primarily concerns America, and our best course would be to unite the great Powers of America, namely, Argentine, Brazil, and Chile, with the United States for a joint enforcement of it. Since it concerns America, and *all* America, reply another group, let us make it a Pan-American affair and unite all of America's twenty-one republics for its support.

Such are what may be called the "seven sister" solutions of our great international problem, and the face and form of each of them are becoming daily more familiar to the American public as the debate proceeds. They all have their partisans, and some of them have secured a large and increasingly vociferous following. But—to change the simile and to associate them with the constructive task of the statesman's craft—these seven lamps

of international architecture are not capable of casting sufficient light upon our problem, and we must seek further for the central sun of truth. That there is such a sun, from which these lamps derive all the light they have, and which is itself capable both of shedding sufficient light upon our problem and of becoming the beneficent solution of it, I am happy to believe. This sun has already risen above our horizon and is shining across the Atlantic from The Hague.

INTERNATIONALISM *versus* IMPERIALISM

The new internationalism, which finds its center at The Hague, requires, in the first place, a genuine belief in the *family* relations of the nations. It demands, not political centralization, not universal imperialism, of course, but international fed-

eration. The United States of America, for better or for worse, has relinquished its policy of isolation, and stands now at the beginning of two paths—that of national imperialism and that of international federation. Its prime characteristics and its most cherished ideals impel it to proceed resolutely upon the path of international federation. Its own history has taught it that liberty *and* union are one and inseparable; and liberty *and* union means liberty *in* union, for the nation as well as for the forty-eight States and for individuals. Its every instinct is opposed to the system of "armed peace," which it has rejected within its borders as destructive both of the Union and of civilization. It has given its heart to "liberty regulated by law," and it is slowly but surely rising to the great task of applying this

principle within the international, as well as the national and the local, arena

That national imperialism is foreign to the very nature of the United States is shown by the fact that beneath the tread of its armies on foreign soil, education, sanitation, an interoceanic canal, and popular government have arisen in defiance of the old imperialistic dicta of *væ victis* and *to the victors belong the spoils*. The cosmopolitan origin of its citizens is a prime source of its pride and its strength, and fits it pre-eminently for the international rôle of our time.

There was a time, not long ago, when an American railway president could say to men seeking to arbitrate an industrial dispute, "The public be damned." The American public declined to accept this consignment, and public opinion has

asserted its sovereign power in every phase of the national life. There is a higher power still which is coming to dominate the affairs of men, and that is the power of *international* public opinion. A "decent respect for the opinion of mankind" is developing—reluctantly, perhaps, but none the less surely—into obedience to its demands. The sun of wisdom and of justice is no longer held to rise and set within the boundaries of our own fair land. Travel, science, literature, a search for foreign markets, dependence upon imports, all the thousand and one ties in this age of wireless telegraphy and flight on, under, and above the oceans, have bound us irrevocably and consciously with the rest of the family of nations. We are nearer Europe than we are to South America, and Japan is

closer to us than Europe was a generation ago. Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark are American, as well as European Powers. Germans and Italians are pouring into South America as they are into the United States, and everywhere the cries of Pan-German, Pan-American, are subsiding before the greater cry of Pan-Human; while "America for Humanity" is taking the place of "America for Americans," and the rights of humanity are asserting themselves more and more against the ambitious designs of national governments.

Applying this great twentieth-century principle of the interdependence of the nations to the problem of the Monroe Doctrine, it becomes evident that the logical and certain solution of it must be the assumption of its rights and responsi-

bilities by the entire family of nations and its subjection to the institutions established at The Hague. I am well aware that this proposition will appear chimerical and even treasonable to such rabid "Americans" as Senator O'Gorman, of this Empire State, who denounces even the living up to certain treaties, solemnly signed and ratified though they be, as a betrayal of the United States and a truckling to Great Britain. Those Americans, senatorial and otherwise, who see in the Panama Canal only *our* canal and *our* water, to be used on such terms as *we* please by our "coastwise" shipping, which shipping cannot be said, of course—since it is ours—to be engaged in *commerce* as the rest of the world understands that term; those who declare that general treaties of arbitration, such as those of

1911, cannot rightly be ratified by the United States Senate, which must also exercise the right of ratifying the *compromis* under *any* arbitration treaty; those who believe, with many officers of our Army and Navy, that, as one of them recently expressed it, "the Mexican bandits, greasers, peddlers, money-changers, backbiters, murderers, and thieves need a sound thrashing and we must give it to them"; those who believe that the "dishonor" which Huerta cast upon the flag can be atoned for only by hoisting the flag in Mexico to stay, or, as Colonel Watterson demands, by carrying it on to Panama,—Americans of this complexion will find no virtue in The Hague solution of the Monroe Doctrine problem.

A distinguished Secretary of State,

yielding to the baleful effects of the military spirit nearly a score of years ago, demanded not only that Great Britain and Venezuela should arbitrate the boundary dispute between them, but that they should submit that dispute to *our* arbitration. The present Speaker of the House of Representatives, emulating that jingo spirit, is reported in a recent speech to have declared:

> We were modest folk when the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed, but we have outgrown that modesty and the Doctrine has grown in strength with us. We now warn the nations of the world not to touch one of the least of these South American republics lest they die.

A newspaper in the Speaker's section of the country applies this philosophy of the mission of the United States as follows:

> The Republic [*our* Republic, of course], triumphant, magnificent, bearing the olive

branch of peace in one hand and the rod of castigation in the other, standing for humanity and justice throughout the world, will be the world's arbiter in time, and largely so from henceforth. And thus justice will be made to prevail throughout the world, and the arbiter of justice will be so strong, both on sea and on land, so unassailable, that to attack him will be hopeless, and peace will prevail because no hope of gain by going to war can possibly be entertained. And that is the kind of peace that must come to the world—a peace through the overwhelming majesty of the American Republic, that is so strong as to be completely able to enforce it, and so just as to compel respect in that enforcement.

When the United States accepted the recent A. B. C. offer of mediation, the Dayton, Ohio, *Journal* declared that "every red-blooded American hides his face in shame"; and the funereal proprietor of sundry yellow journals declared that, "to do our full duty to our own murdered fellow-citizens, to our own nation, and to the nations of the world,

we should invade Mexico, occupy, pacify, and annex it."

But when we clamber up out of the dregs of such yellow jingoism to the serene heights of genuine American democracy, how abnormal and mediæval appear such suggestions as to the "natural boundary" of the United States being the Panama Canal or the Orinoco River. Assuredly the shades of Louis XIV. and Napoleon cannot live long in the normal atmosphere of our time and country. That the United States shall enforce the *Pax Americana* in the Caribbean Sea—the Mediterranean of the West—in imitation of ancient Rome's imperialism and in forgetfulness of the fate which deservedly overtook her—is repugnant to every true-hearted American. We resent Admiral Weber's words before the German

Navy League when he praised the elasticity of the Navy law of Germany by declaring that "in international relations it has lately proved to be a political instrument of equal force with the American Monroe Doctrine and the English two-power standard." We resent the idea of Central America as a sphere of influence or a coterie of protectorates of the United States, and as a field of exploitation for "dollar diplomacy." We resent the stirring-up of revolutions by our own fellow-citizens in neighboring republics, so that their natural resources, such as canal-routes, oil and gold deposits, may become tributary to the almighty dollar of American billionaires. Our Government, at the very least, must cease to respond to appeals for aid in such exploitation, and the Monroe Doctrine

must cease to serve as a cloak for constant intervention in the affairs of the Latin American republics.

A recognition of the logical fallacies and the unbearable responsibilities into which we are inevitably led by our national enforcement of what are unquestionably international rights and duties, has already dawned upon our Government and it has taken an honorable, indeed, a leading part in developing the new internationalism.

In the second Conference at The Hague its delegates led the struggle for the adoption of a world-treaty of arbitration and the establishment of a genuine court of arbitral justice. The third Conference must see the triumph of these great international institutions, and they are precisely the institutions to which may

be safely entrusted the burden of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine.

INTERNATIONALIZING THE MONROE DOCTRINE

In both the first and second Conferences, the United States delegation seized an opportunity to place upon the record-book of the world a reference to the Doctrine, or, as it was euphemistically called, "the traditional attitude of the United States toward purely American questions." This public reference to it was not considered by the rest of the world as bringing it one whit nearer to the status of genuine international law; but it marked at least America's appreciation of a great opportunity, and, it may be hoped, it was the shadow of the coming event.

THE PORTER PROPOSITION

One splendid move was made by the United States itself in the direction of sharing with the rest of the family of nations a portion of the responsibility and burden of the Monroe Doctrine when it secured the adoption by the second Hague Conference of that proposition to which the name of our own General Porter has been given. This provides for the obligatory arbitration of contractual debts before a resort is had to force for their collection; and it was intended to apply especially to Latin American indebtedness to European creditors. But the collection of contractual indebtedness is only one of the multitudinous ways in which an attack on Latin American territory or self-government may invoke

the application of the Monroe Doctrine; and this step must be followed by others in the same direction.

THE HAGUE GUARANTEE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

The neutralization of Latin America by the third Hague Conference, or, better still, a guarantee by that Conference of the territorial integrity of *all* the members of the family of nations, would not only relieve our country of the burden of sustaining this principle of the Monroe Doctrine, but would apply that just and righteous principle to the entire world. The institution of the Court of Arbitral Justice would be greatly facilitated by such a measure; for the smaller members of the family of nations would be more willing to constitute the court on some

one of the plans proposed, if they could be assured that this important element of their sovereignty could not be brought before the bar of a court on which they may not have absolute equality of representation. The ratification of treaties of general and even universal arbitration would also be greatly facilitated, as was shown in the Senate's debate on the Treaties of 1911, by this world-wide application of territorial integrity, the first principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

THE HAGUE GUARANTEE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT

The world-wide application of the second principle of the Doctrine, namely, The Hague guarantee of popular or constitutional, and of solvent and stable governments, although more difficult, is

not, in my humble judgment, impossible. There is no doubt that such a guarantee, if possible, would be far less expensive in lives and money, more effective and more just than a guarantee supplied by the United States alone. With the triumphant march of constitutional government around the world, it represents already nine points of national law, and the burden of proof against it would be placed by any international court of our time upon the opposing party. National courts are daily grappling with far more difficult cases in equity than would be brought before the international court by, for example, the present political problem in Mexico.

The problem, in Mexico and in all other faction-torn lands, has two aspects, namely: the prevention of foreign aid to

domestic rebellion, and the pacification of the rebellious factions.

The United States Congress has already recognized the responsibility of one country for the promotion of a revolt in another, by adopting the significant resolution[1] that "whenever the President shall find that in any American country conditions of domestic violence exist which are promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States," he shall be authorized to lay an embargo on their exportation; and familiar events have recently illustrated the result both of laying and of lifting such an embargo. It may well be that out of such incidents as the German steamship *Ypiranga's* failure to land its cargo of munitions of war in Mexico, this

[1] March 14, 1912.

aid to the maintenance of stable governments may secure world-wide sanction and observance at The Hague. If loans supplied at speculative rates of interest by foreign usurers to incipient rebellions could also be placed under the ban of all the nations at the third Conference, this nefarious kind of "international promotion" would be effectively checked.

Two judicial precedents have already been created in the quelling of rebellious factions; and although they were set up on a relatively small and obscure part of the international stage, they were established under exceedingly difficult circumstances and were wholly effective. These were, first, the arbitration of the revolutionary struggle between Presidents Bonilla and Davila, of Honduras, in 1911, which resulted in the resignation of the latter,

the election of the former, and the end of the civil war; and, second, the issue of an interlocutory decree by the Central American Court of Justice, in 1909, which put an end to a revolutionary movement in Honduras by fixing the *status quo* and by enjoining the neighboring republics of Guatemala and Salvador from giving aid and comfort to the rebellion. The sanction back of such an award by the court of *all* nations at The Hague, including, as it would, all the *vis maxima* of the twentieth century's diplomacy, commerce, finance, and international public opinion, not to mention, if necessary, an international police force, would be ample for its enforcement; and it is inconceivable that any nation on the face of the earth would have the temerity even to contest it.

The *crux* of this problem, of course, is the getting of such cases into court. But, as the United States knows only too well, the modern world is bound too closely together, and is too much under the dominion of the ideals of civilization, to permit the indefinite running of an open sore in the body politic of any member of the international family. This fact would supply the motive force to bring such cases into the international court; while the agencies through which it could be accomplished have been supplied by The Hague Conferences and have already had extraordinary success.

Good offices, mediation, special mediation, commissions of inquiry, a permanent administrative council, a permanent bureau, and a permanent court of arbitration,—such are the agencies created at

The Hague, some of which have sprung into beneficent activity and all of which may be utilized with success in the solution of more difficult problems than that of the Monroe Doctrine.

GOOD OFFICES AND MEDIATION

The extension of good offices by the United States to Russia and Japan helped to bring about the Treaty of Portsmouth and the termination of the most destructive of modern wars. The extension of good offices to the opposing forces in Mexico by the permanent administrative council at The Hague—through whose agency we hope to see the third Conference summoned for 1915—would carry with it such diplomatic and financial prestige that even a Huerta or a Carranza would find it difficult to resist.

The mediation of the United States, Mexico, and Brazil has closed the doors of the Temple of Janus in Central America; and at the present time a most interesting and unprecedented attempt is being made by the A. B. C. Powers both to muzzle the dogs of war between the United States and one faction of the Mexican people, and to mediate between the opposing parties within Mexico itself. This attempt and its acceptance by the parties at issue has been hailed with joy by Latin America, and has received the cordial approbation of the rest of the world; it has put an end to anti-American demonstrations in Mexico City, which were caused by the display of brute force, has secured the release of American captives, and has produced a more genuine belief in the sincerity of the United

States' advocacy of international pacifism than has any other recent event in its history. How much greater would have been the immediate results, and how much more assured would have been, not only peace between the United States and Mexico, but the solution of Mexico's political problem, if this mediation had been offered by the entire family of nations through its agencies at The Hague!

Special mediation, which was the contribution to international procedure by a citizen of this Empire State, the lamented Frederick William Holls, has not yet been resorted to since its cordial endorsement by the first Hague Conference. Personal ambition appears to be too predominant an issue between Huerta and Villa or Carranza for special media-

tion to offer much hope of a solution of the problem between them; but in case of war between the United States and Mexico, and in many another trouble arising out of some phase of the Monroe Doctrine, the utilization of this device would be peculiarly appropriate and probable of success.

COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

International commissions of inquiry, one of which was applied with such admirable result to the dispute between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the incident of the Dogger Bank, have been resorted to by Mr. Taft and Mr. Bryan in most suggestive fashion. Mr. Taft's general treaties of arbitration in 1911 with Great Britain and France went far toward converting such commissions into

a veritable international grand jury designed to bring just such cases as that of Mexico before the international court[1]; and Mr. Bryan's arbitration treaties, fifteen of which have now been negotiated, rely upon these commissions both for securing a delay before a resort to arms, during which cool deliberation may replace hot passion, and for ascertaining by impartial inquiry the exact truth in regard to international disputes. Such a commission of inquiry, especially if appointed under the auspices of The Hague, could have been used with great promise in the investigation of the blowing up of the *Maine* in 1898, and in the present Mexican trouble, both for ascertaining

[1] *Cf.* an address by the author on "The International Grand Jury" at the Second Annual Meeting of the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, 1911; republished in *The New Peace Movement*, ch. vi.

the real condition of affairs in Mexico when Huerta took Madero's place, and for ascertaining whether or not Admiral Mayo's gasoline launch carried the flag at Tampico.[1]

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

The last and greatest step in the assumption of the responsibility for the Monroe Doctrine by the family of nations at The Hague will be taken when the permanent court of arbitration, or, better still, the court of arbitral justice, to which this conference is heartily committed, shall follow the example of the Central American court of justice and

[1] The use of an international commission of inquiry for ascertaining the facts in regard to the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, which was the immediate cause of the present great war, would have been peculiarly appropriate; and it would have been resorted to and effective in preventing the war, had it not been for the specter of Big Armaments and the failure of the peoples to learn the lessons of The Hague.

by a writ of *quo warranto* or an interlocutory decree shall summon belligerent nations and revolutionary factions within a nation to show cause why they should not be held responsible to the family of nations as a whole for their belligerency or factionalism. The immeasurable power of international public opinion which would sustain such judicial action would probably be as potent in its peaceful acceptance as has been the case with the scores of arbitral awards which have been handed down by far less majestic tribunals. Should armed force be ever necessary in sustaining such verdict, it would be supplied by a genuine international police force, acting in the name and under the orders of the court of the entire family of nations. No "punitive expeditions," such as have been the

fashion in Central Asia and as are being undertaken at Vera Cruz; and no "joint expeditions" such as marched into Peking and exacted from China "indemnities" so extravagantly enormous that our own Government at least had the good grace or the good conscience to restore three-fifths of what it had secured; but a genuine international police force, enforcing genuine international justice, under genuine international law.

Thus many and admirable are the vehicles of the internationalism of our time; their motive power must be the determined will of the peoples to use them. In this creation of the popular will, *Nil desperandum* must be our motto. Who would have believed in 1864, when Mr. Thomas Balch, of Philadelphia, began to advocate the arbitration of the

Alabama claims, that within eight years the Geneva Tribunal would have settled the ominous dispute by that apparently utopian means?[1] Who would have dreamed, in 1891, of the first Hague Conference and of the possibility of its epoch-making work? Who would have ventured to prophesy in 1899 that within eight years nearly all the measures of the first Conference would have been put into operation with such extraordinarily beneficial results, and that a second Conference would be held to carry still further the work of the first?

THE HAGUE SOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN PROBLEM

Applying these peace-making measures of The Hague to the successive steps of

[1] *Cf.* Thomas Balch's *International Courts of Arbitration*, 1874, fifth edition, with introduction and notes by Thomas Willing Balch, Philadelphia, 1914, page v.

our present difficulty with Mexico, it is plainly to be seen how this difficulty could have been avoided.

The new Monroe Doctrine led us to refuse recognition to Huerta. "Recognition," since it is the affair of the entire family of nations, should be accorded or withheld, not by the nations acting separately but collectively; and recognition of Huerta should have come in this way after an international commission of inquiry had carefully investigated the *status quo* in Mexico and reported upon the *de facto* government, with which alone international law concerns itself in the matter of recognition.

The new Monroe Doctrine led *our* ships to be on guard in Mexican waters, although the interests of many nations were involved, and thus caused Mexican

hostility to be concentrated upon *our* marines, merchants, exploiters, and travelers. This difficult police task with all of its burdensome consequences should neither be assumed by nor imposed upon the United States alone.

The mediæval custom of permitting rear-admirals to exercise diplomatic powers of which even ambassadors are deprived in these days of the cable and wireless telegraphy, permitted Admiral Mayo to demand a salute to our flag from a pseudo-government whose right to exist we had not recognized. He should have left such a question, which is as much outside of a rear-admiral's province as is the decision of a lawsuit outside the duties of a policeman, in the hands of the Department of State, where it properly belongs; and the State De-

partment should have either declined to accord indirect recognition to Huerta by demanding from him a salute, or determined to sustain the honor of the flag in some more rational way than by using real force against an unrecognized government for a fictitious affront. Some rational action would doubtless have been taken by our Government if it had not been drawn into playing the game of Huerta and of our own militarists by a rear-admiral's exercise of such a preposterously discretionary power, and if it had not been for the dark shadow of the Monroe Doctrine which is cast over our entire dealings with Mexico and Latin America.

THE HAGUE SOLUTION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE PROBLEM

Our insistence upon our own national enforcement of what are international

rights and duties has frequently led us in the past, and bids fair to keep us constantly engaged in the future, in a wildly quixotic, extravagantly sentimental, and universally dangerous picking of other people's chestnuts out of the fire. The Monroe Doctrine, when issued in 1823, was characterized as a new Declaration of Independence; we need now still another declaration of independence from the carrying on our own national shoulders alone of what has become even more than the white man's burden, and which pertains to all mankind. Especially do we need a new Declaration of *Inter*dependence, and the whole-hearted acceptance of the spirit and the tools of the new internationalism which have been created by the entire family of nations at The Hague Conferences, in which

our own American leadership was *facile princeps*.

When the Latin American republics declared their independence, and the Monroe Doctrine was issued in their defence, George Canning proudly boasted: "I have called a New World into existence to redress the balance of the old!" The United States to-day may truthfully claim that it has done much at The Hague to bind the Old World and the New together and to balance national rights by international duties. Let us live up to this high standard, and pledge to its attainment our lives, our fortunes, our sacred honor, and even our cherished "Monroe Doctrine."

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